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Abstract
British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced in the autumn of 2001 that he wanted to
extend individual consumer choice in the public services (Blair, 2001). What do we know from
recent experience about the conditions under which such policies can be sustained? In this
article, the experience of individual consumer choice over the last ten, and in some cases, fifteen
years, is compared across nine fields of British public services. The article identifies the policy
goals for introducing choice, considers how far they were typically achieved, and identifies
problems and unintended side-effects, including distributional problems, inefficiencies and
one type of political risk. This provisional evaluation is based on a widely ranging review
of literature spanning several disciplines. The principal products of the argument are two
detailed tables, setting out, respectively, the degree to which the goals seem to have been
achieved for each choice programme, as far as the available literature can tell us, and how
far distributional, efficiency and political risk problems have dogged consumer choice in each
field. In the discussion section, trends and variations are summarised. Finally, some lessons are
drawn from the comparisons, for policy makers who may be considering the further extension
of consumer choice in public services.
Introduction
In a speech on 16 October 2001 on public service reform billed as a major
statement, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that giving consumers
of public services more choice, at least between providers in the event that an
incumbent provider is failing, should be a central principle for reform over
the next few years. The main concrete initiative announced so far has been
additional choice over dates and times of appointments for elective surgery
or of provider for those who have been kept waiting for longer than the
target (Milburn, 2002; Secretary of State for Health, 2002: Chapter 10; see
also http://www.doh.gov.uk/nhsplanbookingsystems), but there have also been
suggestions from ministers of more choice of individual hospital consultant also
for elective surgery. At the time of writing, it is not clear just what other initiatives
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might be announced. An Office of Public Services Reform pamphlet (2002) hinted
at few new initiatives other than choice for drivers between congestion-charged
routes and longer, non-charged ones.
If there is to be a significant extension of individual consumer choice
schemes in public services, it will be important that their design reflects learning
from the experience of choice in the last decade or more. There is a need for
comparative analysis of that experience between different fields of public service.
For, while many factors that explain the consequences of introducing or extending
individual choice may be specific to particular services, comparative analysis is the
most effective method for distinguishing those service-specific factors from ones
that are more generic. Moreover, policy debate about choice is often conducted
by reference to general claims about its benefits, difficulties or unwanted
consequences, or to hypothesised inferences from one field to another, for the
evaluation of which comparative analysis is well suited. Comparison should also
illuminate the range of possible designs for choice schemes, and may suggest
important clues about the reasons for their being selected, and, we might hope,
at least some hypotheses for further exploration about the relationship between
goals, designs and consequences. Finally, by revealing both what has been learned
about choice and how it has been learned in the best studied fields, comparative
analysis of findings from existing literature can identify what we might usefully
want to learn from future research about the less well-studied fields and about new
initiatives.
This article offers a preliminary and provisional comparison based on a
review of literature on the experience of individual consumer choice since the
late 1980s in nine fields of British public services, examining what can be said
about the extent to which the likely goals were achieved, and of other problems
encountered. It is based on a review of the main available texts, including books
and peer reviewed articles published in English mainly since about 1990 in the
disciplines of social policy and administration, health policy, education policy,
and public administration. Initially, definitions are given of some key terms
used in the article and the scope of the analysis is presented, with definitions
of the nature of choice and the types of goals. In the first substantive section,
the article considers how far, according to the available literature, the goals
for consumer choice in each of these fields has been achieved. In the next
section, key problems experienced are identified and the nine fields compared
in respect of five types of problems – polarisation, segregationist preferences,
adverse selection, disproportionate transaction costs and political risks. The key
products of the argument, then, are two detailed tables setting out findings
on each of these issues. The concluding section draws together some lessons
and implications of the review, for policy makers who may be considering
the design of new programmes of reform to extend consumer choice in these
areas.
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Scope and definitions
In this section, definitions are given for some of the key terms used in this article,
and the scope of the analysis is set out, identifying the nine schemes of individual
consumer choice to be examined in the literature review.
By ‘consumer choice scheme’, in this article, I mean a set of institutionalised
arrangements that provide opportunities to make decisions expressing pre-
ferences between a defined menu of options (cf. Dowding, 1992: 303) in relation
to services in which the state takes a financial or regulatory policy interest (6,
1998).
The present article is concerned exclusively with individual choice and
neither with collective voice (for example, consultation) nor collective choice
(for example, purchase of service contracting). However, it should be noted that
individual ‘choice’ in the context of the public typically means the right to make
an application for a particular provider or package of service or whatever; only in
one of the cases studied in this article did consumers have the power to make a
binding decision, for, in that case, they were given a cash budget to spend in the
private sector (Direct Payments).
At least in principle, a consumer might be given a choice over the content of
a service (specification of inputs or outputs), its level (quantity, perhaps subject
to a charge above a certain threshold), the identity of a gatekeeper (case manager,
commissioner, even, in one of their roles a GP), or a provider, or the manner
of access (face-to-face, by telephone or over the web; choice of time and date of
appointment). Some schemes provide these choices quite generally; others offer
choice only when a commissioner or provider has defaulted in some respect, as in
the newly announced NHS scheme to allow elective surgery patients the right to
choose another or an overseas provider in the event of excessive delay (Secretary
of State for Health, 2002).
I shall use the word ‘voucher scheme’ to mean any scheme where (a) the
government provides a sum of taxpayers’ money to purchase a defined service at
a rate for a defined category of individual, (b) consumers may exercise some
choice over the provider or gatekeeper or at least between units of service with
different characteristics offered by the same provider and (c) that provider is
reimbursed to the rate set by the government, on evidence that the consumer
has used the service chosen. I shall neither limit the word ‘voucher’ only to cases
where the consumer carries a physical token to present to a provider, nor to
cases where separate physical payments are made for each client, nor to cases
where the consumer makes the final decision of service content or of provider
without having to make an application to a public authority: where all these
conditions are present, one might speak of a ‘true’ or ‘strict’ voucher scheme (as
in Direct Payments, social care from 1981 to 1993 and nursery vouchers from 1996
to 1997). In this extended sense, however, all of the schemes examined here are
ones in which a ‘voucher’ is attached to the consumer’s choice: quotation marks
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are used around the term at the beginning of some sections of the article to make
it clear that the broad sense is intended.
The following nine schemes of consumer choice are analysed:
 secondary school choice, introduced in 1988;
 the Nursery Education Vouchers Scheme, introduced in 1996 but abandoned
in 1997;
 higher education, where students could always choose both course and
institution, but where the levels of public support to students were changed
from maintenance grants to loans and, from 1998, loans were introduced for
tuition fees;
 choice of GP, which has always existed in some form but which was reformed
in 1990;
 choice of hospital consultant, which as yet hardly exists at all, save in the context
of joint consultation with one’s GP with whom the selection finally rests;
 choice of treatment protocol, which exists mainly to the extent that clinicians
offer patients choices, and negatively within the rules on patient consent;
 the Direct Payments scheme, which provides users of personal social services
with budgets with which to purchase their own care (Hasler et al., 1999);
 community care, as introduced into law in 1990 but implemented from 1993,
whereby a means-tested scheme through the benefits system, where users made
relatively unconstrained choices of provider, was replaced by some element of
choice at the point of needs assessment and purchase of service by a local
authority; and
 offer systems in the allocation of social rented housing, which have traditionally
afforded rather limited choice, but which have since 1999 begun to be reformed
through the development of Choice-Based Lettings pilot schemes (Department
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000; Department for
Transport, Local Government and the Regions, 2001).
Other programmes could have been chosen. For example, the Housing
Benefit scheme provides a nearly true voucher for housing costs for tenants
in the privately rented housing sector; the Legal Aid scheme provides people
on very low incomes with a nearly true voucher for the costs of legal advice on
certain problems and, in some cases, representation; the NHS prescription drug
scheme provides patients with a ‘voucher’ for clinically prescribed treatments;
each of these is means-tested. There are some schemes to provide subsidies for
children and retired people to use railways and buses. However, it proved difficult
to identify relevant literature specifically on the consequences of consumer choice
of accommodation or solicitor or compliance with prescribed treatment in these
programmes.
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Goals
The goals for which policy makers may introduce individual consumer choice
can be classified as follows (cf. Klein and Millar, 1995).
Consumer-level goals
Goals that are concerned with meeting the needs or demands of consumers
can be divided into the following categories:
1. Outcomes. Where there is evidence that having, or having and exercising
choice itself has positive benefits for consumers, in respect of the welfare
outcomes that government wants to promote, policy may provide choices to
that end, for example that exercising choice promotes health (Segal, 1998) or
that control over one’s life including choosing enhances health (Syme, 1996);
for evidence that exercising choice can have positive effects on outcomes in
mental health, see Roth and Fonay (1996), Horvath and Symonds (1991),
Safran and Muran (1996), all cited in Department of Health (1999: 43). There
may be some evidence that exercising some element of choice, jointly with the
physician, between treatment options has beneficial effects upon treatment
outcomes, at least for some patients and for some conditions (Darkins, 1996,
cited in Morgan, 1998: 76, n. 15).
2. Acceptability: Some consumers may subjectively feel that choice is important,
and that it is objectively unreasonable that they should be denied choices in
a given area. Thus, it may be politically important for government to be seen
to offer them those choices (this has been very important in the debate about
education vouchers in the US: Chubb and Moe, 1990; Moe, 1995); it may be
less important in complex health care issues, at least for some older patients
(Beisa¨cker, 1988).
3. Satisfaction: There are cases where there is evidence that, even controlling for
the objective characteristics of a service after choice, consumer satisfaction is
raised by consumers having choices, typically about content and level but also
of provider (for example, Doty et al., 1996 find this for people with disabilities
using personal social services making choices about carers, timing, and use of
budgets: the study did not control for objective characteristics of services, and
so is not conclusive, but the size of the effect was significant). Where higher
levels of reported consumer satisfaction are an important goal, government
may want to introduce choices of these kinds. However, there is also evidence
that being put into a situation where one has to make a choice, such as having
to change one’s GP, can reduce satisfaction with services (Inglehart, 1995
cited in Wilton and Smith, 1998); however, even people who feel dissatisfied
(personally, or in the short term) because of the burden of choice might still
feel that choice was important (generally, or for themselves in the longer
term).
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4. User convenience: In some services, some element of consumer choice can
hardly be avoided in practice, and while this may hardly be a goal, in practice
the service will be organised around this recognition.
Service-level goals
The most important goals concerned with promoting characteristics of
service supply-side systems are those of:
5. Experiment : In this case, choice about content of service is used as a means
of finding out which service packages are preferred, by whom, or how far
innovations in content attract consumer interest.
6. Responsiveness: Here choice about identity of content or of provider is used in
order to promote competition or at least contestability, as a discipline upon
providers to offer service content that consumers actually want, in respect
both of quality of current service models and innovation in content.
7. Efficiency: Here, choice of provider is offered in order to promote efficiency
(lower unit costs for given level of output or higher level of output for given
level of cost), by structuring the financial arrangements behind consumer
choice to bear down on costs.
8. Cliente`le: Here, choice about content and level is offered, in order to keep
middle-class consumers from exercising their choice to exit and use private
commercial services instead.
9. Presentation: Here, choice is used on a political rather than a technical policy
rationale, in order to mask the operation of other goals, for example by
offering consumers something in compensation for cuts being made at the
same time (Henig, 1994: Chapter 4 and Hassel, 1999 suggest that at state level
in the US, this may have been important in some cases in the development,
respectively of school choice and charter school initiatives).
Assessing goals is not always easy, for overtly avowed goals may not, of
course, be the true goals. Sometimes the avowed goals and the foreseeable
consequences of the measures (foreseeable, that is, within what the ideological
blinkers of the government of the day would allow) seem to coincide, as in the
case of community care where the avowed goal was that of efficiency (Wistow
et al., 1994, 1996). Other cases are harder to understand. The 1988 school choice
reforms were presented by ministers principally as means for achieving greater
diversity and responsiveness of schools to the particular preferences of parents.
Yet the simultaneous introduction of the national curriculum and the greater
regulation of systems of financial management introduced through the local
management scheme, and the introduction of the league table as the principal
or even the sole basis for competition together with the greater regulation
of local education authorities could all be said to have undermined diversity
(Levacˇic´, 1994; Glatter and Woods, 1994; Woods et al., 1998; Gewirtz et al., 1995;
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Whitty et al., 1998; Gorard, 1997). Curriculum diversity could be achieved
mainly through specialisation, for example by converting a school into a City
Technology College. Choice in nursery vouchers was expected to improve quality
and responsiveness (Education and Employment Committee, 1997).
Sometimes goals are not very clear at all: in general, the more modest the
level or degree of choice, the less clarity about goals we find: for example in the
health field, goals for GP choice were not well articulated by ministers (Klein,
1995), although in giving fundholding GPs choice over hospitals, responsiveness
was regarded as important (Robinson and Le Grand, 1993; Le Grand et al., 1998).
Therefore, in identifying goals, I have followed explicitly claimed intentions where
possible, and reconstructed goals by inference from the foreseeable consequences
of scheme design only where this method fails. Where it is difficult to reconstruct
goals at all, because systems have persisted for a long time and where the element of
choice, being modest, was probably more a matter of administrative convenience
than of positive political decision, a question mark is entered after a plausible
entry. The first row of Table 1 below presents a plausible reconstruction of goals.
Achievements
It is not straightforward to determine to what extent the goals have actually
been furthered by these programmes of consumer choice. With the important
exception of secondary school choice, there are few objective, comprehensive,
detailed and rigorous published evaluations of the implementation of consumer
choice schemes against their objectives in any of these fields. Table 1 is an
attempt to summarise the findings of a large number of researchers reviewing
the experience of choice in these fields.
School choice
School choice has been most extensively researched and evaluated, and
in this area there is also an extensive cross-national comparative literature
(Woods et al., 1998; Gewirtz et al., 1995; Whitty et al., 1998; Gorard, 1997, 2000a,b;
Gorard and Taylor, 2002; Gorard and Fitz, 1998a,b; Noden, 2000; Taylor, 2001;
Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Walford, 1996; Adnett and Davies, 2000).
Many writers stress the variation between localities in the experience and
extent of choice, the nature of parental preferences, the importance of local
history, the entrepreneurship and innovativeness of heads and local philanthrop-
ists, and therefore the difficulties of generalising (for example, Taylor, 2001;
Adnett and Davies, 2000). This is of course true of each of the fields of public
service. The fact and depth of local variation is not to be denied. However, it
need not follow that nothing can therefore be said, albeit with qualifications,
about how far goals have been achieved. For example, there are many differences
in parental involvement and preferences that have more to do with class than
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locality, and that can be observed nationally. The basic dynamics of curriculum
regulation, national specification of ‘voucher’ size, the importance of peer
effects in shaping class preferences, the incentive effects of league tables, and
relationships between selective and non-selective schools are broadly common,
even if the size of the effects of these factors vary significantly by locality. Whilst
the full range of local variation cannot of course be represented in tables like
those presented here, their modest aim is simply to provide indications of general
trends.
Certainly, the school choice scheme appears popular with many parents,
and has achieved good satisfaction ratings from majorities. A recent nationally
representative cross-sectional survey of children in school years 5 to 7 found
high satisfaction rates outside London, both with the process of choice and
with the school chosen (Flatley et al., 2001). It is possible, of course, to argue that
satisfaction reflects cognitive dissonance reduction, or persistence of and spillover
from institutionalised positive attitudes among parents to schools generally
(surveys have long reported general satisfaction with schools), but there is no
evidence that such factors could be powerful enough to explain the very high
proportions satisfied with both in the Flatley et al. (2001) survey.
As noted above, other concomitant policies have limited the extent to which
responsiveness and experiment could be elicited. Although we lack any control
against which to check the counterfactual hypothesis, the scheme may have
contributed to keeping a significant proportion of the middle class within the
system, except in London and the south east (Whitty et al., 1998; Flatley et al.,
2001). Curriculum innovation, even by specialisation, was modest, and could only
be achieved by large, successful schools (Adnett and Davies, 2000). Assessing
the impact on efficiency is much more difficult, since the scheme was not
introduced in isolation, and many other reforms have affected costs. One large-
scale quantitative study found that where choice has increased competition locally
(the study controlled for the presence of cream-skimming selective schools,
but did not control fully for the fact that they may not be competing for the
same kinds of pupils, nor could it examine parental choice behaviour directly),
this resulted in improvements in efficiency between 1993 and 1997, although it
found diversity in the foci of efficiency (Bradley et al., 1999). Here efficiency is
defined as joint maximisation of GCSE grade A to C achievement and attendance
rate (one minus the school truancy rate) for a given level of inputs, assuming
constant returns to scale; the study measured this on a government data set
from the School Performance Tables for all secondary schools in England and
other unpublished data specially obtained from the Department for Education
and Employment (as it then was) on pupil–teacher ratios, socio-economic
background of pupils and LEA expenditure on books, material and teachers and
from the National Online Manpower Information Service on socio-economic
composition of school districts.
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One key policy problem here is the absence of a very flexible mechanism
for market entry in the state sector. While in theory private schools can opt in,
few have done so and fewer have been successful. Local authorities can establish
new schools but their fiscal constraints mean that they do not always do so at
levels that would be considered responsive to changes in consumer demand. The
City Academy scheme allows for new schools but even this lacks the flexibility of
some of the US states’ charter school schemes (Hassel, 1999) or of the Dutch
and some Scandinavian countries’ schemes that grant groups of parents the
right to found new schools and secure public resources for them, subject to
certain conditions (Walford, 1996). A second problem is the fact that the ‘special
measures’ system does not always quickly either turn failing schools around or
effect their exit. There are, however, important problems with the school choice
system that the simple focus on avowed and implicit goals taken in this table does
not reveal, but which will be discussed in the next section.
Nursery vouchers
Because the Nursery Vouchers scheme was terminated so quickly after being
introduced, rather little can be said about the extent to which it would have
achieved its goals. Indeed, the column on the scheme is only retained in the table
in order to give due emphasis to the incoming Labour administration’s view that
its transaction costs were excessive in proportion to the size of the scheme and
any benefits it was likely to have by way of impact on quality or total market size –
all of which may well have been true (cf. Sparkes and West, 1998).
There is evidence that it was not greatly supported by parents. A Central
Office of Information and MORI poll in March and April 1996 interviewed
201 parents living in areas where vouchers had first been introduced. Sixty one
per cent of those questioned rated the voucher scheme positively and 23 per
cent negatively. However, a subsequent MORI survey in the summer of 1996,
questioning605parents, found 76per cent saying that it had made no difference to
the number of places available and 83 per cent saying that it made no difference
to the their ability to exercise their choice of provider (Education and Employ-
ment Committee, 1997).
The Education and Employment Committee’s (1997) report on the operation
of the Nursery Education Voucher Scheme argued that the scheme may have led to
a reduction of parental choice – in the sense of number of available providers
to choose between – rather than an increase, and that this should have been
expected. For schools entered the market in significant numbers, being better
able to expand in response to changes in demand than were local playgroups, and
the bulk of the voucher income went to schools for reception classes, not least
because the more popular schools used reception class attendance as an admission
criterion for subsequent primary education. This caused some private providers
to close. However, the report also noted that the evidence was still inconclusive
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about whether provision would increase in future, and how far parents’ choice
would increase.
Higher education
Whatever the other problems with that sector, the experience of consumer
choice in higher education is arguably the happiest of the nine compared here,
at least until recently. The supply side may have seen little market entry, but
existing providers have expanded to meet rising demand financed by steadily
expanding state funding until the mid-1990s. A recent economic modelling
exercise concluded that the market structure as measured by the number of
universities was roughly appropriate to the economies of scale estimated to be
available with the present technologies of teaching, that there might be a case for
a limited number of mergers but that any expansion should take place within
existing universities (Johnes, 1997). There has been innovation in courses to
the point that educational traditionalists are critical of universities for excessive
responsiveness to student preferences and insufficient dirigisme and paternalism.
Despite the shift from grant to loans and even the introduction of loans for
tuition fees, the middle class has remained solidly within the state subsidised
sector, although there may have been a modest reduction in demand since
the introduction in 1997 of tuition fees and consequent changes in consumer
behaviour and increasing concern among potential students about the risks
involved with shouldering the larger debts than previous cohorts of students
faced (Dolton et al., 1997; Watson and Bowden, 1999; Parry, 1999; Hesketh, 1999;
Ahier, 2000; Archer and Hutchings, 2000).
Health and social care
Where only modest changes has been attempted, unsurprisingly they have
been achieved but with no great enhancement of consumer experience. The very
limited direct consumer choice in the NHS, combined with patient inertia over
GP choice and continuing willingness to defer decisions to clinicians together
mean that, to the extent there were clear goals for consumer choice, they cannot
be said to have been achieved.
In studies, many patients are reported to be offered few choices by their GPs,
although GPs claim to offer more, and the 1990 reforms appear not to have greatly
increased choice (Mahon et al., 1993; Jones et al., 1993; Shackley and Ryan, 1994;
Mulligan, 1998; Fotaki, 1998). In the same way, the absence of clear goals for the
very limited (and longstanding: Merrett, 1979) element of choice in social rented
housing, makes it difficult to say much about achievement.
The Direct Payments scheme, in those areas where it has been implemented
adequately, seems to have been broadly popular with those service users who have
been offered budget management responsibility (Maglajlic et al., 2000; Clark and
Spafford, 2001; Glendinning et al., 2000a,b). However, we still have no rigorous
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large-scale studies on the impact on service users’ well-being from exercising
these choices.
A recent review of evidence on actual levels of choice in community care
for older people (Knapp et al., 2001) found only two studies to report. These,
however, were rather discouraging. Wigley et al., 1998, cited in Knapp et al.,
2001) found most consumers reporting very little choice. One in-depth study
of 24 users in four localities (Hardy et al., 1999a,b) found that in six out of ten
cases examined, applicants were given no choice about whether to move into a
home: no domiciliary care option was presented at all. In most cases, applicants
were given poor quality information about the options with which they were
presented. Those who ended up in local authority homes were offered even less
information than those who went into private or voluntary sector run homes. No
one who did receive domiciliary care was offered a choice presented in terms of
sector or provider; few if any were consulted about the composition or even the
timing of services. Although most respondents seemed content with the services
they were receiving, the study may not have controlled fully for expectations.
Most other studies have found that assessment and commissioning continue to
be ‘service-led’, in the jargon of the field – that is to say, needs defined and
care purchased on the basis of what has historically been the dominant form
of provision (Davis et al., 1997). A picture of at best modest improvement is
given in a new study of 55 users, 37 carers and 28 care managers in seven English
authorities (Ware et al., forthcoming). This found care managers reporting more
provider options in some areas but much less perception of choice among users
and carers. Least choice of providers was presented for domiciliary care, and the
study found little scope for user choice over content of service: tight eligibility
criteria limited choice of content as well as access. In residential care, the greater
numbers of options available to care managers than in previous years did not
necessarily mean that users were presented with more choices, and many were
offered few or none; many also received little information on which to make
choices. About 10 per cent of cases where discharge from hospital is delayed are
explained by user choice not to accept the care package (or packages) offered
(Social Services Inspectorate, 2002). Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that
there is significant choice of residential care provider on offer in major cities and
seaside towns.
Table 1 summarises the findings of the literature review on goal achievement.
Problems with consumer choice programmes
There are also less-fortunate consequences of consumer choice programmes that
should probably fairly be regarded as unintended by governments – although,
of course, cynics will always be able to claim that governments must surely have
foreseen some of the consequences.
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TABLE 1. Achievement of avowed or reconstructed goals in consumer choice programmes.
Field of Nursery Higher Choice of Choice of Choice of Direct Social rented
choice/goal School choice vouchers education GP consultant treatment payments Community care housing
Avowed or Responsiveness, Efficiency Responsiveness? None in Perhaps Patient Outcomes, Efficiency Responsiveness?
reconstructed efficiency (through particular: responsiveness? acceptability? acceptability, (through exit, entry
goals for (through encouraging Outcomes? choice experiment, by private sector
individual competition, competition regarded as responsiveness? and competition),
consumer exit of failing and entry by inevitable; ? outcomes
choice and expansion private sector) at most, through more
of successful) user supported living in
convenience own homes
Outcome Not known Not tried for Not known, No evidence Some Some Some Little evidence: No evidence;
long enough but presumed experimental experimental evidence most outcomes probably not
evidence esp. evidence esp. research does not a meaningful
psychotherapy psychosomatic control for choice measure
conditions separately
Acceptability Achieved Not achieved Achieved Achieved Limited Mixed Achieved Achieved Limited
for many
Satisfaction Achieved Not tried for Achieved Achieved Limited Mixed Achieved Achieved in some Limited
for many long enough for many areas, e.g. big cities
and seaside towns
Convenience Achieved Achieved Achieved Limited and Limited and Achieved Achieved in some Limited
for some except in may be may be areas, e.g. big cities
London and declining as declining as and seaside towns
some other patients have patients have
big cities to travel to travel
(high housing further further
costs)
Experiment Limited by Undermined Significant Little No impact Present but Too small Limited: financial Negligible: any
regulation by school evidence not response scale to tell: pressures de facto incentives for
domination to choice may be at the worked against innovation are
margin non-residential administrative
care in many areas
Responsiveness Limited by Limited Achieved Limited Little Present but Too small Limited: financial Negligible
regulation not response scale to tell: pressures de facto
to choice maybe at the worked against
margin non-residential
care in many areas
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Efficiency Some High Increased No Not sufficient Not sufficient Unknown Some competition No evidence of
achievement, transaction supply by evidence incentive incentive in residual care any impact
but little costs existing of gain in cities and
market entry universities seaside towns; less
Limited Limited entry in domiciliary;
evidence on or exit main incentives
costs some from economy
Competition evidence of from cash ceilings
limited by cost control
polarisation
and
congestion at
top of market
Cliente`le Some Not tried for Achieved Middle- Not Not Not relevant: Some evidence for Not relevant
retention achievement long enough or class significant significant exit achievement
except SE with sufficient clientele incentive: exit incentive: exit impossible
England increase in exit for elective for elective for many in
resources unlikely in surgery surgery these client
any case growing in growing in groups
any case any case
Sources Gewirtz et al., Education and Ahier, 2000; Charny Mahon et al., Mahon et al., Hasler et al., Knapp et al., 2001; DETR, 2001;
1995; Glatter employment Watson and et al., 1990; 1993; Jones 1993; Jones 1999; Wistow et al., 1994, DTLR, 2001;
and Woods, committee, Bowden, Shackley et al., 1993 et al., 1993 Maglajlic et al., 1996; Wigley et al., Clapham and
1994; Woods 1997; Sparkes 1999; Dolton and Ryan, 2000; 1998; Bland, 1999; Kintrea, 1986;
et al., 1998; and West, 1998 et al., 1997; 1994; Clark and Ware et al., Pawson and
Gorard, 1997; Johnes, 1997; Fotaki, Spafford forthcoming Kearns, 1998
Kendall and Hesketh, 1998; 2001;
Holloway 1999; Goodwin Glendinning
2001; Middleton, 1998; et al., 200a,b
Walford, 2000; Parry, Glennerster
1996; Levacˇic´, 1999; Power, et al., 1994
1994; Whitty 2000
et al., 1998;
David et al.,
1994; Flatley
et al., 2001
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The social policy literature is bulging with very diverse taxonomies and
discussions of problems with consumer choice programmes. In order to introduce
some order into the discussion, some forcing of material into a taxonomy and
perhaps even some arbitrariness in selecting priority problems is unavoidable.
In focusing on the three categories of problems, Table 2 attempts to mitigate
these problems by taking categories from the literature wherever possible, and by
selecting problems on each of what appear to be the three main areas. These are
problems of distributional process and outcome (coded D), problems of efficiency
(coded E) (one problem at least has had to be given both codes: no doubt there
is a case that others could be too), and problems of political risk (coded P) by
which is meant the possibility that politicians and professionals may be subject to
embarrassment and criticism in the media or from interest groups for allowing
some consumers to rely on public funds when they choose certain services that
may be deemed by others to be ‘bad’, ‘frivolous’, ‘inappropriate’ or ‘ineffective’
choices.
Distributional outcomes: polarisation
The literature on school choice shows the greatest concern with problems
with zero-sum distributional outcomes (Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Walford, 1996;
Woods et al., 1998; Gordon, 1996; Gorard, 2000a,b; Gorard and Taylor, 2002;
Gorard and Fitz, 1998a,b; Noden, 2000; Taylor, 2001). Polarisation can be defined
as the situation in which the market separates into a ‘sink’ sub-sector of under-
performing suppliers located in disadvantaged areas unable to attract good staff
and for which there are falling levels of consumer demand and no competition
between consumers for access, and an ‘e´lite’ sub-sector of high-performing
suppliers located in wealthy, leafy areas able to attract good staff, with high
levels of applications, where there is congestion, and where in effect the suppliers
choose the consumers. Where there are no mechanisms in the overall policy
mix to compensate for this, the risks are that the worse schools get worse, the
best expand to the limit of their capacity but no further, and the life chances of
those who are unable to get into the best schools are systematically reduced with
consequent negative effects upon the possibilities for meritocracy and social
mobility in the higher education sector and the labour market, and for
social closure among educational ‘classes’, as well as for polarisation in housing
market values which comes to be heavily driven by school selection rules that
use geographical catchment areas. The result, where this occurs, is that parents
in each sector feel that they either have no choices or else that their choices are of
no great value to them.
This problem has been found to be most severe in New Zealand (Fiske and
Ladd, 2000; Ladd and Fiske, 2001; Gordon, 1996; Waslander and Thrupp, 1995).
In the UK, there is dispute about how serious the problem is. Certainly, prior to
school choice being introduced, there was and since then there has continued
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to be great polarisation: choice has done rather little to break the link between class
and educational outcome, as even its defenders admit (Gorard and Taylor, 2002).
Gorard and Fitz (1998a,b) argue that polarisation may have worsened initially as
middle-class parents quickly learned to use the new system, but, as other families
learned, the effect moderated (the so-called ‘starting gun hypothesis’). Other
ways of calculating the trend data, which can be argued to be superior, suggest a
steady but very modest increase in polarisation (Noden, 2000). Certainly, there
is still a spectrum of middling schools in much of the UK. However, a number
of qualitative studies have diagnosed polarisation, especially in London and the
south east (Woods et al., 1998; Flatley et al., 2001; Walford, 1996; Glatter and
Woods, 1994): some quantitative studies using simple percentage changes have
found polarisation (Gibson and Asthana, 1999), but the appropriateness of such
numbers has been challenged as being insensitive to size of population and overly
sensitive to marginal effects (Gorard, 2000a,b). On the other hand, Gorard and
Fitz’s apparently consoling calculations may underestimate the exacerbating role
of peer effects (Noden, 2000: 376).
Probably, regulation of curriculum and inspection of school performance
have moderated polarising tendencies. It is at least possible that the problem
might be reduced further if there were more effective mechanisms for market
entry into the state sector – as in the US, where the charter school movement has
provided some element of entry (Hassel, 1999) – and if more effective means could
be found for tackling the seemingly intractable problem of ensuring faster exit for
failing schools with reallocation of pupils or else turning around failing schools,
for the first would perhaps relax the zero-sum character of the competition, while
the second might limit the damage to those locked into what can become a ‘sink’
sub-sector.
The problem of zero-sum polarisation is probably also exacerbated by several
other problem factors, including the presence of segregationist preferences among
more affluent parents, the inertial effect of the preferences of some parents with
children in under-performing schools, and the possibility that the financial size
of the ‘voucher’ compensation for disadvantage may be inadequate to create a
sufficient incentive for good schools to compete for these children, and to attract
the best teachers to work with them; high transaction costs, where these are a
problem, may also be a contributing factor. However, for the purposes of making
comparisons between services, these can and should be treated independently.
Unfortunately, the presence and scale of most of these factors have been much
more comprehensively treated in the education and health literatures than in
other fields of social policy.
Segregationist preferences
There have been well-publicised cases of segregationist preferences taking the
form of racism in some school areas, including a major conflict in Dewsbury in the
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1980s (Gorard, 1997: Chapter 1), and various suggestions that the riots in several
northern towns and cities during 2001 may reflect segregationist preferences in
schooling and housing (closely linked in any case). Gewirtz et al. (1995) found
parents expressing distaste for their children being schooled alongside ‘rougher
elements’, which they interpret as code for segregationist preferences at least by
class if not necessarily by race. Some studies find that some middle-class parents
actively avoid choosing schools with disadvantaged intakes (West et al., 1998).
Perhaps segregationist preferences will always out sooner or later, even in schemes
where choice is administratively limited, but differently designed choice schemes
will give expression to those preferences in different ways. However, segregationist
preferences may simply reflect an intuitive appreciation of the value of effects of
peer influence on children: unfortunately, the value of these has been found to
be much greater for low-ability than for high-ability children Zimmer and Toma,
2000) and perhaps even damaging for high-ability children (Argys et al., 1996),
making segregation doubly damaging to egalitarian aspirations for distributional
outcomes.
In higher education, there has certainly always been an element of
segregationist preference by social class and other ascribed identities (Ball
et al., 2002; Power, 2000), but it may be that the general expansion in
funding and supply until 1997 and the improvement in academic quality of
socially less-prestigious universities has in recent decades acted to compensate
for any segregationist effect: for in general, segregationist preferences are less
damaging in positive-sum contexts and where the relatively greater value of
the services preferred by high-status segregationist choosers is being eroded.
Again, the enhancement of regulation of university teaching during the 1990s
may have limited any forces for polarisation (Dolton et al., 1997: 715; Middleton,
2000).
Interestingly, a mid-1980s study on take-up of offers in social rented housing
found that segregationist preferences did have a damaging distributional effect
upon the quality of homes occupied by less-advantaged tenants (Clapham and
Kintrea, 1986). A more recent study of allocation policies for hard-to-let properties
suggests that the scale of that effect may be rather less now, perhaps partly as
a result of points-based lettings schemes (Pawson and Kearns, 1998). The new
pilot projects for Choice-Based Lettings schemes are to be designed, according
to central government guidance, not only to allow more choice, but also to allow
different generations of the same family to live near to each other once again
(Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, 2001). In the
1980s these ‘sons and daughters policies’ were vigorously challenged on equal
opportunities grounds as effectively ways of preserving the predominantly white
character of certain areas, and the analysis of the 2001 riots in the northern
towns has suggested that geographical segregation in housing may have been a
contributor factor to lack of inter-communal understanding and trust. It remains
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to be seen whether the effect Clapham and Kintrea detected in the mid-1980s will
be increased by Choice Based Lettings.
In other services, disadvantage arising through segregation is certainly not
uncommon but tends not to be an effect of consumer preferences. For example,
there are some ways in which in health care the size of the inverse care law effect
(that those who need the most and the best health care get the least and the
poorest: Tudor Hart, 1971) may partly reflect segregationist preferences among
some clinicians, but is probably not generally greatly affected by segregationist
preferences among patients about the kinds of other people with whom they are
willing to share the waiting room.
Cream skimming, adverse selection and adequacy
of ‘voucher’ differentials
There are fields or markets in which, despite the ability of consumers
to back their choices with a publicly financed ‘voucher’, suppliers can still
engage in cream-skimming selection between consumers, and, where this is
uncompensated, it can lead to adverse selection. Cream-skimming incentives are
often greatest where suppliers are rewarded for recording good crude outcome
states in consumers’ health or training or whatever, rather than for value added.
This is a well-documented and significant problem in schools, especially for those
schools with high levels of applications that can afford to choose pupils likely
to perform well academically, not present discipline problems, and not have
health or pastoral problems (Woods et al., 1998). Views differ about the scale of
the cream-skimming activity of GPs in patient list management, but one major
mid-1990s study found that it was smaller than expected even when, under the
fundholding scheme, it might have been thought that both the incentives and
ability to skim the cream would have been at their greatest (Glennerster et al.,
1994; Matsaganis and Glennerster, 1994). A recent review concludes that the stop-
loss insurance scheme which provided that health authorities would reimburse
fundholding GPs for patients with higher than threshold costs, and the limited
personal financial exposure of GPs, meant that, despite early anxieties, there was
little cream skimming (Goodwin, 1998: 57–8). There is anecdotal evidence that
housing associations, despite their new role in providing housing for the poorest
as a result of the transfer of local authority housing, continue to attempt to
select tenants in way that leave the most disadvantaged with worse choices, and
sometimes only with the residual local authority sector, but no comprehensive
studies on this have been found.
Debates about the adequacy of voucher differentials to compensate for
disadvantage are, as one would expect in such a politically salient area, never
settled empirically, for each side can appeal to different criteria and measures, as
well as to different preferred ideal models (Bowles and Gintis, 1996; Le Grand,
1989; Brighouse, 2000; Moe, 1995; Hoxby, 2001). In the health care field, any
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remaining cream-skimming incentives for GPs due to inadequate differentials
have probably been reduced since 1997. In community care, there is some evidence
that differentials for severe disability are not adequate in many areas (Wistow
et al., 1996; Knapp et al., 2001); one problem with the Direct Payments scheme is
that the formulae used to calculate budgets vary greatly by locality and individual,
making it difficult to assess adequacy (Glendinning et al., 2000a: 199).
Again, however, the education field is the one with the richest body of
research. The basis on which the capitation fees for schools in the UK are
calculated has changed since 1988, but, within the local authority sub-sector,
where the greatest variations in ability and disadvantage are to be found, central
government’s leverage is limited by the fact that it can typically only give fiscal
incentives to local education authorities to use the recommended figures on the
basis of which government calculates the proportion of grant aid for education.
Local education authorities retain some discretion, although regulation does
put a minimum figure on what local education authorities can allocate to
schools. This means, although the nationally set formula has a redistributive
and compensating effect (Levacˇic´, 1994: 38–40), the degree of differentiation in
the size of per-pupil payment to compensate for disadvantage varies between
authorities, and, nationally, it is argued by some experts not to be large enough
(Glennerster, 1998: 58ff; Glennerster, 1992: 208). The same experts also note that
the elasticity to additional resources of schools’ productive effort with the most
disadvantaged cliente`les, as measured by changes in educational qualifications
achieved, is depressingly low; therefore regulatory changes to the exit system
would be required, for differential weighting of vouchers may be insufficient to
compensate for disadvantage (Glennerster, 1993: 194). Most studies on which that
argument is based were conducted prior to the introduction of parental choice
(see those reviewed in Glennerster, 1993: 194).
One could argue that the introduction of school choice should have
disciplined schools to improve their productivity, and perhaps even in ways
that would raise the qualifications outcome elasticity to additional resources for
disadvantaged pupils (Hoxby, 2001). However, the theoretical models (including
Hoxby’s) on which that possibility is based tend to assume that
 schools are competing with each other, whereas there is evidence that many do
not need to compete greatly;
 that schools compete on academic qualifications achieved alone, despite the
evidence that many parents in fact choose schools on other criteria;
 that they tend not to take account of cream skimming, when again there is
evidence to the contrary; and that
 schools maximise on their goals, when this may well not be the case.
Moreover, too many still model the redistributive effect of differential weighting
of vouchers by, for example, household income, without making sufficiently
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realistic assumptions about the differential elasticity of the supply-side response
(for example, Bearse et al., 2000).
Indeed, to the extent that the parents of the least advantaged are least likely
to choose on the basis of academic achievements alone, and to the extent that
schools serving these groups are least likely to be able to compete on these
terms, the likelihood of a positive effect from choice alone is reduced. Moreover,
there are many ways that schools could increase productivity, and increasing
educational value added as measured by qualifications for the least-advantaged
pupils is only one, and not necessarily the most likely. Schools that satisfice, rather
than maximise, are more likely – if competitive conditions will allow this, and
typically they will – to improve productivity by controlling costs for the same
level of output (value added, qualifications and grades for pupils, etc.), rather
than trying to increase output for the same level of cost. Bradley et al., 1999
find a variety of efficiency practices, partly in response to differences in local
competitive conditions.
The introduction of tuition fee loans in higher education in 1998 may have
exacerbated the problem of voucher inadequacy for the least advantaged. More
generally, the problem of consumers being chosen rather than choosing also
arises in respect of voucher-issuers as well as in respect of producers. The
discretionary nature of the implementation of the Direct Payment scheme may
have created problems of this kind in the selection of service users for budget-
holding (Maglajlic et al., 2000; Clark and Spafford, 2001).
Transaction costs
Differential weighting of vouchers, while certainly justifiable and perhaps
mandatory on grounds of equity, always has high transaction costs, for voucher-
issuing agencies who must obtain, process, check and make decisions using a
great deal of information about individuals in order to determine which category
in the system of triage their needs or disadvantage fall into, for producers who
must reclaim costs under the system, and for consumers who must work out
how to use the system and how to present themselves in order to secure the best
trade-off between voucher size and stigma.
In general, the more conscientious choosers – who tend to be better off in
absolute terms and so better able to absorb the time and travel costs involved in
such choice – are less deterred by these transaction costs. A number of studies
have shown these transaction costs for consumers to be an important factor
in both efficiency and distributional outcomes in school choice (Gewirtz et al.,
1995; Woods et al., 1998; Gorard, 1997; David et al., 1994). It is also a well-known
problem in higher education choice, but the factors in that field that to some
degree compensate for cream skimming and prevent zero-sum polarisation mean
that these transaction costs for consumers do not create such great problems.
Studies of the community care field have shown that transaction costs for
258 perri 6
voucher-issuing bodies in local government and for suppliers are significant
(Wistow et al., 1994, 1996; Knapp et al., 2001); Glendinning et al., 2000a,b
find high transaction costs for consumers in administering Direct Payments,
especially in hiring personal assistants. In the case of GPs list management, it is
hard to tell whether the additional administrative burden of handling differential
voucher sizes for different patients alone represents a major problem, for other
administrative responsibilities have also increased.
Political risks
Political risks arising from ‘embarrassing’ choices made by consumers using
public funds have sometimes been a problem in some areas with the use of Direct
Payments for, for example, aromatherapy or reflexology (Glendinning et al.,
2000a: 197), which has attracted adverse local media comment (Maglajlic
et al., 2000), and has been a problem for the few remaining ‘progressive’ schools
in the state sector, and for some kinds of courses in the higher education sector. In
health care, the political risks have been contained by the growing centralisation of
the rationing system through NICE and the evidence-based medicine movement,
although, at various times, in vitro fertilisation, some psychotherapeutic services,
some cosmetic surgical procedures and orthodontistry on the NHS have attracted
adverse media comment and specific rationing (Redmayne, 1995).
Table 2 summarises the findings of the review of the literature on these
problems.
Trends and variations in consequences of consumer choice
between services
On the evidence of the literature reviewed here, there is remarkable variation
between the nine fields in the UK, in what has been attempted, in what has been
achieved, and in the incidence of the problems encountered.
Table 1 shows that there is also great variation in the degree to which the
goals have been achieved. Space does not permit adequate examination here of
the power of the main alternative explanation for the variation in goal
achievement. However, promising lines of enquiry would include consideration
of how far those areas marked by under-achievement are ones in which
fundamental design problems are found in the programme that would have
led to failure applied to any field, and of how far field-specific factors to do with
the nature of consumer preferences or the nature of the goods and services over
which choice might be exercised can explain these differences.
Efficiency
In general, this analysis suggests that there has often been greater success
in securing responsiveness than in securing efficiency, if, within efficiency, we
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include both static productive efficiency (bearing down on unit costs) and some
factors that should make for static allocative efficiency, such as ensuring that
consumers choose suppliers and not the other way around.
In school choice, Bradley et al. (1999) find that greater competition from non-
selective schools does elicit greater efficiency, that the effect has increased over
time as the choice scheme becomes institutionalised, and that competition from
closet rivals has the greatest effect: they measured competition by the number of
schools between two radii centred around a given school for 1, 2 and 5 kilometres.
The study measured the effect of selective schools’ cream skimming leaving the
less-able and motivated pupils to other schools reducing their absolute GCSE pass
output: in fact, the efficiency-reducing effect was small and often not statistically
significant. However, polarisation limits competition, unless regulation limits its
effects.
Securing responsiveness and innovation seem most likely to be achieved
in areas such as higher education where at least between 1988 and 1997, the
rationing restrictions were relaxed to support expansion, where there is regulation
of process (for example, a focus on teaching quality) rather than of content
(for example, the absence of any national curriculum type direct restrictions
on content innovation in the higher education sector) and where there are no
financial disincentives that militate against innovation (for example, universities
faced nothing like the fiscal rules that local authorities introduced, partly in
response to central government rules, that militated against supporting as fast
a growth in domiciliary care as the 1989 white paper promised). Importantly,
if productive efficiency in the university teaching sector is measured – as
policy makers do typically measure it – by staff–student ratios, then during the
1990s period of expansion and innovation in courses, efficiency also increased,
suggesting that there is no necessary trade-off, at least in the short run, between
responsiveness and efficiency, at least on those measures. Of course, if it is true
that, despite the evidence from the teaching quality assessment system, high
staff–student ratios have significantly reduced teaching quality in ways masked
by grade inflation and if it is true – as some pundits have suggested using anecdotal
evidence – that new subjects are often not well taught, then it might be necessary
to revise this judgment; however, these things have not yet been shown.
Productive efficiency, at least on some measures, can be achieved in the
short run by bearing down on voucher size. This seems to have been the case in
residential care financing during the 1990s where rates were held down in many
areas from about 1996 if not before, until perhaps 2002, when ‘market stabilisation’
became the policy (Department of Health, 2002). There is continuing and
unresolved controversy, however, about how far this resulted in a net loss of
beds and of homes, over and above the rate of closure that would have occurred
had local authority rates per person risen slightly more generously over that
period: a pessimistic view, held of course by the residential care industry bodies,
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TABLE 2. Unintended problems with consumer choice programmes in the UK.
Field of
choice/ Nursery Higher Choice Choice of Choice of Direct Community Social rented
problem type School choice vouchers education of GP consultant treatment payments care housing
D: Zero-sum Potentially Not tried for Slight Not Not Not severe No May be a Some
polarisation quite severe; long enough severe severe small evidence
may be limited to tell problem in
by regulation; some parts
prior polarisa- of residential
tion was in care
any case
severe
D: Segregationist Significant, Not tried for Significant, but May be some Unlikely Not Not May be Some evidence:
consumer choice severe in some long enough not severe; may relevant relevant some in too early to tell
within publicly areas esp. SE to tell be partly residential re Choice-
financed sector England, but compensated by care based lettings
always true regulation of schemes
teaching quality
D: Uncompensated Significant May have Not a severe Probably Limited May be Not May be Some evidence
cream-skimming problem in been problem; may limited relevant relevant significant for RSLs, and
by suppliers some areas important have been worse some LAs
re Oxford and against
Cambridge prior homeless
to 1988
D: Inadequate May be May have Probably limited Even less Not Probably May be Significant Not relevant
differential significant been prior to 1998 significant even important limited important, in respect
voucher important introduction of than under but too of some
compensation for tuition fee loans internal market early to tell disabilities
individual
disadvantage
D/E: Producers Severe, at top Significant Important Limited risk May be Not Significant May be May become
choose consumers of market phenomenon, significant relevant problem significant more
but not due to significant as
considered a discretionary RLs replace
problem, or at nature of local
least partially eligibility authorities
compensated for scheme
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E: Lack of Severe problem No: schools Small problem, Problems, but Problems, Not relevant Not important Significant Entry by RSLs
market entry entered offset by strong not arising from but not in most areas: problem in is mainly
rapidly capability of consumer choice arising from in future, there domiciliary response to
existing consumer may be labour care in some administrative
universities to choice shortages for areas measures, not
expand in certain helper consumer
response to roles choice
demand
expansion
E: Lack of exit: Significant, Not tried for Relatively small Not known Possibly No No May be a Significant
consumers locked despite long enough problem important problem in problem
into failing administrative to tell some areas
suppliers ‘special
measures’
E: High Significant Significant Moderately high Part of wider Not Not relevant Too early to Some evidence Significant
transaction costs problem for problem for for consumers problem of important tell: at present, of burden for costs for LA
for consumers, more suppliers and suppliers administrative seems some suppliers suppliers in
producers, conscientious burden on containable administering
financing agency choosers suppliers points schemes
E: Weak No No No Observed, but May be May be Significant Significant
incentives for may not be significant significant problem in problem
consumers to important residential care
shop around for
more economical
option
P: Political risks Only at the No At the margin No No At the Some evidence Only important No
from financing margin for some for some margin, re alternative in occasional
choices unpopular stigmatised faith courses mainly for therapies scandal
with others schools, IVF, some
surviving elective
‘progressive’. cosmetic
schools, etc procedures
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TABLE 2. Continued
Field of
choice/ Nursery Higher Choice Choice of Choice of Direct Community Social rented
problem type School choice vouchers education of GP consultant treatment payments care housing
Sources Gewirtz et al., Education Ahier, 2000; Charny et al., Mahon et al., Mahon et al., Maglajlic et al., Knapp et al., DETR, 2001;
1995; Glatter and Watson and 1990; Shackley 1993; Jones 1993; Jones 2000; Clark and 2001; Wistow DTLR, 2001;
and Woods, employment Bowden, 1999; and Ryan, 1994; et al., 1993 et al., 1993 Spafford, 2001; et al., 1994, 1996; Clapham and
1994; Woods committee, Dolton et al., Fotaki, 1998; Glendinning Wigley et al., Kintrea, 1986;
et al., 1998; 1997; 1997; Johnes, Goodwin, 1998; et al., 2000a,b 1998; Bland, Pawson and
Gorard, 1997 Sparkes and 1997; Hesketh, Glennerster 1999; Ware Kearns, 1998
Noden, 2000; West, 1998 1999; et al., 1994 et al.,
2000a,b; Gorard Middleton, forthcoming
and Fitz, 1998a,b; 2000; Parry, 1999;
Goard and Taylor Power, 2000;
2002; Taylor, 2001; 1999; Power, 2000
Kendall and
Holloway, 2001;
Walford, 1996;
Levacˇic´, 1994;
Whitty et al., 1998;
David et al., 1994;
Flatley et al., 2001;
Adnett and Davies,
2000; Bradley
et al., 1999
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would lead one to conclude that economy was achieved at the expense of
choice.
Achieving efficiency, defined as both allocative and productive efficiency
for at least constant quality, relies in part on consumers being able and willing
to choose on the basis of objects of preference, that will serve to discipline
producers. However, where significant proportions of consumers do not choose
in this way, choice – or at least choice alone – may not bring about efficiency.
For example, school choice schemes will tolerate academically under-performing
schools where significant numbers of parents choose schools on non-academic
criteria, and, if the prevailing policy definition of efficiency is one of unit cost
for a given or increasing level of academic achievement, this is a weakness. The
‘starting gun’ hypothesis might be augmented with an institutionalist thesis about
preference formation and change that over time the experience of a choice scheme
will discipline parents to shift their preferences toward more strictly academic
criteria. However, such a thesis has yet to be shown to be empirically defensible.
Acceptable distributional outcomes
The distributional outcomes of choice might be appraised on egalitarian
(allocating benefits or opportunities arising from receiving the service to all
clients without distinguishing by social class, ability to pay, etc.) or else on
meritocratic standards (allocating benefits from receiving the service according
to ability, skill, intelligence, merit, desert, etc).
While these standards quickly diverge, there is some common ground
between them. Distributional outcomes of consumer choice programmes are least
likely to be considered acceptable on either of these bases, where there is limited
market entry, where there are problems of lock-in of consumers with under-
performing suppliers, where significant numbers of conscientious choosers
have segregationist preferences, where many less-conscientious choosers have
inertial preferences, where voucher differentials are insufficient to compensate
for differences in disadvantage or need or cost-to-service, where skilled labour
has preferences for easy-to-deal-with consumers or for living in wealthy and
leafy areas, where the elasticity of supply-side response is subject to ceilings in
expansion, and, finally, where there is nothing much to offset producers’ financial
incentives to cream-skim.
However, dealing with all of these problems is costly for the public purse,
especially where the only way to deal with them is to be prepared to finance
continued rather than once-for-all expansion in the total size of the market.
Choice, rationing and expenditure control
Crucial to the fiscal viability of programmes of consumer choice in public
services is finding a way to reconcile stimulus of choice with the requirements of
rationing and expenditure control. This is true, even in fields such as community
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care where individually paid top-up fees are used and are found to be fairly
widely politically acceptable. In the long term, as the experiment in the 1980s of
using open-ended benefit financing to expand residential care showed, complete
relaxation is not fiscally sustainable. There are basically four strategies for
reconciling choice and rationing, and none is without problems:
1. control prices, as in the case of Legal Aid, or private rented housing prior to
1988 and still to some extent in the social rented housing sector;
2. limit costs eligible for subsidy, as in the case for community care and for
Housing Benefit for rented housing, which is much the same as allowing ‘top
up’ fees;
3. limit the range of products subsidised, as in the case of the NHS pharma-
ceutical budget; or
4. limit choice by physically limiting the numbers eligible, as US schemes for
private school vouchers have done.
Each of these strategies has its risks. Price control deters entry and can
stimulate exit; limiting eligible costs can do the same; limiting the range militates
against responsiveness and innovation; limiting needs risks unacceptable distri-
butional outcomes.
Of course, trying to control unit costs by bearing down on voucher size
cannot easily be combined with using regulation on quality that pushes up costs,
without being willing to accept significant market exit, mergers and acquisitions
and slower rates of expansion, as some commentators on the New Labour
educational reforms of 1997–2001 have found (Kendall and Holloway, 2001).
Although there remains controversy about the effect of the new regulations in
the Care Standards Act 2000 on residential care, industry representatives have
argued that the anticipation alone of increased costs has resulted in higher rates
of closures and lower rates of investment and entry than would otherwise have
occurred, not least due to the tightening of bank credit and of the equity market
for the sector. As yet it is too early for research findings to settle this, and there
will always be room for disagreement about appropriate counterfactuals, but, in
2002, the government appeared implicitly to accept this argument by agreeing
to relax some of the standards thought to be the most expensive for providers
(Carvel, 2002).
Conclusion
Few would oppose increased choice for consumers of public services on general
principle. However, designing policies to support greater individual choice
presents government with both technical challenges and with conflicts of values.
If they are willing to settle upon clear goals – a big ‘if ’ in any policy process – then
they must choose between the available goals, and be willing to accept that all the
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good things do not go together. The review suggests that goals of maintaining
and incrementally raising satisfaction, and some improvement in efficiency can
be achieved, but those of responsiveness and experiment are more difficult and
more expensive to achieve. The tighter the fiscal constraints and rationing, the
more difficult it is to achieve these goals.
Moreover, if policy makers are concerned about equitable distributional
outcomes, and want to avoid some of the problems of adverse selection, zero-
sum polarisation and segregation on the basis of ascribed characteristics, then
they must be prepared to spend large sums, for none of the design solutions to
these problems are cheap. Adequate differential weighting of vouchers, expansion
of total market size, compensation for incentives to cream-skim, and trans-
action cost absorption are all expensive. That there are hard choices to be made
between combating social exclusion and fiscal rectitude is hardly news, but at a
time when New Labour ministers are proclaiming loudly that they can achieve
both, perhaps a reminder is timely.
Moreover, any initiative to extend consumer choice must take account
of the lessons of the last fifteen years, and in particular of the experience of
implementing the reforms of the third Thatcher administration. These represent
the policy inheritance (Rose and Davies, 1994), and that inheritance, whilst by no
means immutable, also defines the range of existing organisational capabilities in
each of these services. New or extended programmes of consumer choice would
require new capabilities among voucher-issuers and producers, even if they can
be designed in ways that do not assume any change in the patterns of consumer
preferences and willingness to bear the costs of conscientious choice.
Mr Blair’s statement of intent in his (2001) speech may serve to raise
expectations. If policy makers are willing to raise expectations of this kind, they
must expect that if they cannot find affordable and feasible ways to meet them,
they risk losing significant political support.
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